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SEX IS NOT A THREE-LETTER WORD: THE 
EFFECT OF MANIPULATING THE DEFINITION 
OF “SEX” ON THE FUTURE OF TRANSGENDER 
ATHLETES 
Emily Grubman* 
Title IX makes it unlawful for educational institutions receiving federal 
funding to discriminate “on the basis of sex.”  But in the context of high 
school and college athletics, and specific to transgender athletes, what should 
the meaning of “sex” be?  The Obama administration believed that “on the 
basis of sex” in Title IX includes “gender” in the meaning of “sex.”  How-
ever, the Trump administration has proposed revoking that understanding, 
limiting the term “sex” to mean male or female, defined at birth.  In the com-
ing year, the Supreme Court may decide in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc. v. EEOC whether sex discrimination laws apply to discrimina-
tion against transgender people.  Its ruling will be instrumental as precedent 
for lower courts in deciding Title IX cases.  
This Note analyzes what the Supreme Court should consider in making 
its final judgment.  This Note argues that the current interpretation of “sex” 
under Title IX should be maintained as defined by the Obama administration 
to mean that transgender high school and college athletes must be allowed to 
participate on the sports team that corresponds with their gender identity.  
This conclusion is supported by case law, as well as a close textual reading 
of Title IX, namely its use of the word “sex,” a term that can be interpreted 
broadly. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There can be “no denying that transgender individuals face discrimina-
tion, harassment, and violence because of their gender identity.”1  Andraya 
 
* Loyola Public Interest Scholar and J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2020.  
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Yearwood is a seventeen-year-old transgender sprinter at her high school in 
Connecticut who is transitioning from male to female.2  She has consistently 
done exceedingly well in all competitions in which she has participated.3  As 
a result, opponents and spectators do not want her to compete, at least not on 
the women’s team.4  Connecticut, however, has an inclusive policy regarding 
sports, where transgender athletes can compete without restrictions on the 
team that corresponds with their gender identity.5  Due to her success and the 
success of other transgender female athletes in track and field in Connecticut, 
three cisgender female track and field athletes from Connecticut—athletes 
“whose gender identity and gender expression align with [their] sex assigned 
at birth”6—filed a Title IX discrimination complaint in June 2019 over Con-
necticut’s inclusive policy.7  They claimed that it put them at a competitive 
disadvantage and hurt their chances of earning college athletic scholarships.8  
In response, Yearwood stated, “[i]t is so painful that people not only want to 
tear down my successes but take down the laws and policies that protect 
 
1. Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 528 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(citing Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 
2017)). 
2.  Pat Eaton-Robb, Transgender Sprinters Finish 1st, 2nd at Connecticut Girls Indoor 
Track Championships, THE WASH. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2019/feb/24/terry-miller-andraya-yearwood-transgender-sprinter/ [https://perma.cc/S77L-
3Y64]. 
3. Id. 
4. Mirin Fader, Andraya Yearwood Knows She has the Right to Compete, BLEACHER 
REPORT (Dec. 17, 2018), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2810857-andraya-yearwood-knows-
she-has-the-right-to-compete [https://perma.cc/FR7W-8CYW]. 
5. Samantha Pell, Girls say Connecticut’s Transgender Athlete Policy Violates Title IX, 
File Federal Complaint, THE WASH. POST (June 19, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/sports/2019/06/19/girls-say-connecticuts-transgender-athlete-policy-violates-title-ix-
file-federal-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/76TA-M47R]. 
6. Definitions Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity in APA Documents, 
APA 1, 4 (July 8, 2019, 6:28 PM), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5JNA-XBGA] (Defining cisgender as “[a]n adjective used to describe a person 
whose gender identity and gender expression align with sex assigned at birth.”). 
7. Letter from Alliance Defending Freedom to the U.S. Department of Education, Office 
for Civil Rights (June 17, 2019), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/SouleComplaintOCR.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MQR4-73PF]. 
8. Id. 
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people like me.”9  Yearwood acknowledged being “stronger than many of 
her cisgender competitors,” but also recognizes that female athletes “who are 
not transgender may have other advantages.”10  “One high jumper could be 
taller and have longer legs than another, but the other could have perfect 
form, and then do better,” Yearwood told one media outlet.11  “One sprinter 
could have parents who spend so much money on personal training for their 
child, which in turn, would cause that child to run faster.”12  Claiming that 
because an athlete is transgender, and therefore may have an advantage over 
her cisgender counterparts, does not justify taking away that athlete’s Civil 
Rights protections, including their protections under Title IX. 
Title IX must support transgender athletes to protect these individuals 
from the humiliation of such lawsuits.  Title IX makes it unlawful for educa-
tional institutions receiving federal funding to discriminate “on the basis of 
sex.”13  But in the context of high school and college athletics, what should 
the meaning of “sex” be? Courts often turn to case law interpreting Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when faced with a Title IX case.14  Title VII, 
however, governs sex discrimination in the employment context.15 
In a policy statement on the subject of transgender athletes, the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) defined “sex” as “the physi-
cal characteristics typically used to assign a person’s gender at birth, such as 
 
9. Pell, supra note 5. 
10. Eaton-Robb, supra note 2. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2019). 
14. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 718 (4th Cir. 2016). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2019) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
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chromosomes, hormones, internal and external genitalia and reproductive or-
gans.”16  Additionally, the NCAA defined “gender” as “[t]he complex rela-
tionship between physical traits and one’s internal sense of self as male, fe-
male, both or neither as well as one’s outward presentations and behaviors 
related to that perception.”17  It clarifies that biological sex and gender are 
different because biological sex is connected to one’s physical anatomy, 
whereas gender identity is not.18 
In a Dear Colleague Letter, a federal directive that, although lacks the 
force of law, still contained an implicit threat, specifically that schools that 
did not abide by the directive could face lawsuits or lose federal funding, the 
Obama administration’s Departments of Justice and Education argued that 
the phrase “on the basis of sex” in Title IX encompasses this concept of gen-
der identity.19  Under this interpretation, Title IX bars discrimination against 
transgender people in athletics, which includes prohibiting a transgender in-
dividual from playing on the team that corresponds with his or her gender 
identity.  However, the Trump administration proposed revoking that under-
standing.20  It published its own Dear Colleague Letter in response to the 
Obama administration’s letter, withdrawing the guidance that gender identity 
should be included within the definition of “sex” in Title IX.21  Subsequently, 
in October of 2018, a memo prepared by the Department of Health & Human 
Services revealed that the Trump administration is working to remove 
 
16. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER 
STUDENT-ATHLETES at 22 (Aug. 2011), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Transgender
_Handbook_2011_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFD7-HKM9]. 
17.  Id. at 22. 
18. Id. 
19. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Just., Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students (May 
13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-
transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/66FA-CBAH]. 
20. Letter form U.S. Dep’t of Just., Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/press-release/file/941551/download [https://perma.cc/3PP2-42RA]; see also Erica L. 
Green et al., ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump Administration, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-ad-
ministration-sex-definition.html [https://perma.cc/499X-HCSE]. 
21. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 20. 
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Obama-era protections for transgender people.22  The administration is 
“spearheading an effort to establish a legal definition of sex under Title IX” 
that would limit the term to refer only to the physical characteristics that 
determine whether a person is biologically “male” or “female.”23 
In response to the leaked memo, a group of twenty state attorney gen-
erals urged the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to not adopt 
the proposed narrow definition of “sex.”24  The attorney generals believe this 
change would cause the exclusion of transgender and gender nonconforming 
individuals from civil rights protections.25  In fact, the Trump administra-
tion’s withdrawal of policies enacted under the Obama administration will 
impact more than which locker room or restroom transgender individuals are 
allowed to use.26  With no definitive federal law or rulings on the question 
of transgender athletes’ participation in sports, transgender individuals will 
likely lose the right to participate on the sports team that corresponds with 
their gender identity.  Instead, transgender athletes will have to participate 
on teams that align with their biological sex at birth. 
On April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC (“EEOC”).27  The Court 
is set to decide “whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against 
transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereo-
typing under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins” (“Price Waterhouse”).28  Even 
though Price Waterhouse is not a Title IX case, courts often interpret Title 
 
22. Green et al., supra note 20; Natasha Bach, What the Trump Administration’s Proposed 
Gender Rules Changes Could Mean for Trans People, FORTUNE (Oct. 22, 2018), http://fortune.com
/2018/10/22/transgender-rights-trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/Y4EC-R8G3]. 
23. Green et al., supra note 20; Bach, supra note 22. 
24. Don’t Define ‘Sex’ To Exclude Transgender, AG Healey Says; 19 State AGs On Board, 
31 Not, NEWBOSTONPOST, (Nov. 20, 2018), https://newbostonpost.com/2018/11/20/dont-define-
sex-to-exclude-transgender-ag-healey-says-19-state-ags-on-board-31-not/ [https://perma.cc/2EJT-
3NRD].  
25. Id. 
26. Bach, supra note 22. 
27. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 
(Apr. 22, 2019). 
28. Id. (citation omitted). 
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IX cases based on rulings in Title VII cases.29  This Article will analyze what 
the Supreme Court should consider in making their final judgment as it could 
resolve the dilemma surrounding transgender athletes. 
This Article argues that courts should maintain the Obama administra-
tion’s interpretation of “sex” under Title IX, and by extension, Title VII.  
This means transgender high school and college athletes must be allowed to 
play on the sports team that matches their gender identity.  This conclusion 
is supported by case law that interprets the term “sex” in Title IX and Title 
VII to encompass gender identity, as well as a close textual reading of Title 
IX, and in particular, its use of the word “sex,” a term that can be interpreted 
broadly.  To adopt the Trump administration’s proposed definition would be 
to abridge transgender individuals’ civil rights,30 including their right to be 
free from discrimination in federally-funded education programs as provided 
by Title IX.31 
Section II of this Note discusses the legal background of Title IX.  Sec-
tion III begins by examining case law that could be applicable in a suit 
brought by a transgender student athlete alleging sex discrimination.  It also 
analyzes the text of Title IX and Congress’s intent in drafting and passing 
the statute.  The Section will conclude that of the existing case law interpret-
ing “sex” in Title IX and Title VII, the most persuasive cases are those that 
interpret “sex” to include gender identity.  A close reading of the text of Title 
IX will also show that this interpretation is required.  Section IV provides a 
factual and medical background regarding transgender athletes, as well as 
emphasizes the policy reasons why student athletes should be able to play on 
the team that matches their gender identity.  This Section also looks to policy 
implications to illustrate the advantage of the Obama administration’s defi-
nition of “sex” for the world of sports.  Section V discusses solutions, such 
as redrafting Title IX to explicitly protect transgender individuals, passing 
independent legislation specifically regarding the protection of transgender 
persons, and local school board adoption of guidelines that protect these in-
dividuals.  Irrespective of Trump’s or a future administration’s prerogative 
towards transgender persons, Title IX must be reworded as it carries with it 
the power of being binding law.  Section VI concludes that because Title IX 
 
29. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 
(7th Cir. 2017); Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 867 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
30. See Bach, supra note 22. 
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2019). 
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was designed to protect civil rights in the manner to be described in this Ar-
ticle, and because courts across the country are acknowledging this, legisla-
ture need only clarify this law to make it indisputable that transgender rights 
are protected. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX 
This Section provides a brief overview of the legal background of Title 
IX.  Specifically, it describes what the statute says, how it is interpreted by 
courts, and how the Obama administration and Trump administration differ 
in their interpretations of its language.  The Obama administration believes 
that the statute can be interpreted to protect transgender individuals, whereas 
the Trump administration says that because the plain text of the statute does 
not include the words “transgender” or “gender identity,” transgender per-
sons are not protected.32  It also provides information on where states cur-
rently stand on transgender athletic participation in high school sports.  
Lastly, it gives an overview of the current circuit split regarding whether the 
term “sex” in Title IX encompasses gender identity, again with many courts 
arguing that the term “sex” can and should be interpreted to include gender 
identity, and other courts claiming that because the text of the statute does 
not include gender identity, the statute does not protect transgender individ-
uals.33   
 
32. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Note, Sex in Sport, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 65–
66 (2017). 
33. See Dodds v. U.S. Dept. Of Edu., 845 F.3d 217, 219–20 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
discrimination against transgender students likely constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX of 
the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution); 
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1039 (holding that discrimination against transgender students constitutes 
sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the U.S. Constitution). But see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 
(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that discrimination against transgender workers may sometimes consti-
tute sex discrimination under Title VII but that such discrimination was not covered in all cases); 
Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (holding that Title IX does not 
prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or transgender status); Johnston v. Univ. of Pitts-
burgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that Title IX does not prohibit discrimi-
nation based on gender identity or transgender status). 
GRUBMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/20  1:14 PM 
168 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
This Note uses definitions accepted by the American Psychological As-
sociation for the terms “gender identity,”34 “transgender,”35 “cisgender,”36 
and “transsexual.”37  Additionally, it uses Planned Parenthood’s definition 
of “transitioning” as “the process of changing the way you look and how 
people see and treat you so that you become the gender you feel on the in-
side.”38 
Title IX would govern any claim of sex discrimination by a transgender 
student athlete.39  The statute states that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”40  Courts turn to case 
law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance when 
faced with a claim brought under Title IX because there is more Title VII 
case law.41  Title VII, however, governs employment, and specifically states 
that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
 
34. Definitions Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity in APA Documents, 
AM. PSYCHOL. ORG. (July 8, 2019, 6:28 PM), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-def-
initions.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM6S-LBNB] (stating that a person’s gender identity is “a person’s 
deeply-felt, inherent sense of being a boy, a man, or male; a girl, a woman, or female; or an alter-
native gender (e.g., genderqueer, gender nonconforming, gender neutral) that may or may not cor-
respond to a person’s sex assigned at birth or to a person’s primary or secondary sex characteristics. 
Since gender identity is internal, a person’s gender identity is not necessarily visible to others.”). 
35. Id. (defining transgender as “an adjective that is a umbrella term used to describe the 
full range of people whose gender identity and/or gender role do not conform to what is typically 
associated with their sex assigned at birth.”). 
36. Id. (defining cisgender as “an adjective used to describe a person whose gender identity 
and gender expression align with sex assigned at birth.”). 
37. Id. (stating that being transsexual refers to a situation “when one’s gender identity and 
biological sex are not congruent.”). 
38. What do I Need to Know About Transitioning?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://
www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/sexual-orientation-gender/trans-and-gender-nonconforming-
identities/what-do-i-need-know-about-transitioning [https://perma.cc/UH3N-T5DP]. 
39.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2019). 
40. Id. 
41. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 718 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.”42 
The Obama and Trump administrations have espoused opposing views 
on how to interpret the language of Title VII and Title IX, specifically the 
word “sex.”43  The Obama administration included what is termed “gender 
identity” in its interpretation of “sex” in Title VII and Title IX.44  The Trump 
administration declined to follow this interpretation.45  Because of the ambi-
guity in how to properly interpret the statutes, federal courts are in disagree-
ment over whether transgender discrimination constitutes a denial of oppor-
tunity “on the basis of sex” under Title VII and Title IX.46 
States have different policies regarding participation eligibility for 
transgender student athletes.  With regard to kindergarten to high school age 
athletes, out of the fifty states and Washington D.C., the following states 
currently have an inclusive policy: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connect-
icut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, Washington D.C. and Wyoming.47  In these states, no 
hormone therapy or surgery is required for transgender students to partici-
pate on the sports team that corresponds with their gender identity.48  Seven-
teen states consider transgender inclusion on sports teams through a state-
 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2019). 
43. Coleman, supra note 32, at 65–66. 
44. Id. at 63. 
45. Id. at 66. 
46. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 
F.3d at 709; Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); Dodds v. U.S. Dept. Of Edu., 845 
F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2016); Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518 (3d 
Cir. 2018). But see, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Johnston v. Univ. 
of Pitt., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016) (opposing transgender inclusion in Title VII protections). 
47. K-12 Policies, TRANSATHLETE (2019), https://www.transathlete.com/k-12 [https://
perma.cc/AJ5Y-XEPN]. 
48. Id. 
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determined process, which can include a case-by-case basis or individual re-
view.49  Eight states have a policy that requires athletes to play on the team 
that corresponds to their biological sex on their birth certificate or, if a 
transgender person has surgery to transition, the person must go through a 
hormone wait period before being allowed to participate.50  The remaining 
six states have no policy concerning transgender athletes.51 
Currently, there is a circuit split among the courts of appeals over 
whether the term “sex” is inclusive of gender identity in Title VII and Title 
IX, and therefore protects transgender individuals from discrimination.  Nu-
merous federal courts have ruled that sex discrimination laws, including Title 
IX, apply to discrimination against transgender people.52  Only a few recent 
cases have rejected this view.53  The Supreme Court’s forthcoming ruling in 
EEOC54 could conclusively resolve the uncertainty surrounding the interpre-
tation of “sex” by deciding the scope of the term under Title VII.   
  
 
49. Id. (Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wis-
consin). 
50. Id. (Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Texas). 
51. Id. (Hawaii, Mississippi, Montana, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia). 
52. Dodds v. U.S. Dept. Of Edu., 845 F.3d 217, 219–20 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that dis-
crimination against transgender students likely constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution); 
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that discrimination against transgender students constitutes sex discrimination under Title 
IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution). 
53. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that dis-
crimination against transgender workers may sometimes constitute sex discrimination under Title 
VII but that such discrimination was not covered in all cases); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 
3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (holding that Title IX does not prohibit discrimination based on 
gender identity or transgender status); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 674 
(W.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that Title IX does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or 
transgender status). 
54. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 
(Apr. 22, 2019). 
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III. TITLE IX AND HOW IT HAS BEEN APPLIED TO CASES INVOLVING 
THE RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS 
This Section argues that Title IX protects transgender individuals not 
only because numerous courts have agreed that it does, and the logic these 
courts used is correct, but also because the language of Title IX supports this 
interpretation.  Courts that have found Title IX and Title VII to protect 
transgender individuals generally hold that Title IX and Title VII protection 
is afforded to transgender individuals because gender identity discrimination 
is a subset of sex discrimination.55  Additionally, because the language of 
Title IX is ambiguous, it is necessary to look to the intentions and goals of 
the drafters of the statute, which leads to the same conclusion that gender 
identity discrimination is a part of sex discrimination.  Assuming this to be 
true, a transgender student athlete who is denied access to the team that cor-
responds with his or her gender identity, based on his or her gender non-
conformity, would have a cause of action for per se sex discrimination in 
violation of Title IX. 
Today’s legal disputes regarding transgender athletics involve both Ti-
tle VII and Title IX because courts interpret these statutes in reference to 
each other.  However, there are currently no reported cases involving 
transgender athletes under either Title VII or Title IX.  The most prominent 
litigation involving a transgender athlete was actually decided under state 
law.  In Richards v. U.S. Tennis Association, Dr. Renee Richards, a post-
operative transgender woman, was prevented from qualifying and participat-
ing in the United States Open Tennis Tournament as a woman in the 
Women’s Division.56  The governing bodies wanted her to take a sex-chro-
matin test to determine whether she had two X chromosomes, which the 
court held violated the Human Rights Law of New York and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.57  Since Richards, the issues that are litigated with regard to 
transgender athletes have shifted from unfair sex verification testing to the 
possibility of actionable sex discrimination claims for disparate and unequal 
 
55. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2005); Bd. of Educ. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 865–70 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Doe by & through Doe v. 
Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 536 (3d Cir. 2018); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester 
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 729 (4th Cir. 2016); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 
(1989); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047. 
56. Richards v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
57. Id. at 268, 272. 
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treatment.58  This is where the interpretation of Title IX and Title VII be-
comes crucial. 
A. Title IX and Its Application to Transgender Rights 
In recent years, cases concerning transgender individuals have become 
more prevalent, and many courts have found that the term “sex” includes 
gender identity in both Title IX and Title VII.59  Courts have found several 
reasons why Title IX protects transgender individuals.60  First, these courts61 
cite the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, where a plurality 
found that sex stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination.62  Second, the 
courts cite the holding in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (“On-
cale”), where the Supreme Court held that statutes often reach beyond the 
original problem they were enacted to eliminate.63  Third, recent courts have 
cited to persuasive policy statements that recommend including gender iden-
tity within the ambit of “sex” in statutes such as Title IX.64  Meanwhile, the 
reasoning proffered by courts that hold otherwise is that the text of Title IX 
 
58. Jennifer V. Sinisi, Note, Gender Non-Conformity as a Foundation for Sex Discrimina-
tion: Why Title IX may be an Appropriate Remedy for the NCAA’s Transgender Student-Athletes, 
19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 359 (2012). 
59. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 865–70; Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 
at 536; G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 729; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235; Whitaker, 858 
F.3d at 1047. 
60. See, e.g., Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d at 536 (citing Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 
1049) (holding that Congress’s intent in passing Title IX grew to encompass the protection of 
transgender individuals); G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 718 (citing to the Department of Educa-
tion’s Office for Civil Rights regulations implementing Title IX to determine that “sex” includes 
gender identity and therefore protects transgender individuals); Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047–48 (re-
lying on the holding in Price Waterhouse and Oncale that both held that a broad interpretation of 
Title IX was necessary and therefore protected transgender individuals); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 
F. Supp. 3d at 865–70 (relying on the interpretations of other courts, as well as the holding in 
Oncale calling for a broad interpretation of Title IX to protect individuals, including transgender 
individuals, from the evils originally envisioned by the drafters of the statute). 
61. See, e.g., Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d at 536; Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047–48; 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 865–70. 
62. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228. 
63. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
64. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 19. 
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and Title VII does not explicitly use the terms “gender identity,” “gender 
transition,” or other similar terms.65 
As the Supreme Court held in Oncale, a Title VII case, “statutory pro-
hibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal 
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”66  The “principal 
evil”67 that concerned the drafters of Title IX and Title VII was likely not 
discrimination against transgender individuals.  Today, however, sex dis-
crimination against transgender persons is a “reasonably comparable evil”68 
that needs to be addressed and recognized by courts. 
In recent years, concerns surrounding transgender rights continue to 
cause debate.  One example concerns a transgender individual’s right to use 
a particular bathroom or locker room that corresponds with that individual’s 
gender identity.69  The circuit courts of appeals are somewhat split over 
whether Title VII and Title IX protect this right.  While numerous federal 
courts have ruled that they do,70 a few recent cases reject this view.71  Finally, 
 
65. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Johnston v. Univ. 
of Pittsburgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 672 (W.D. Pa. 2015); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 
810, 832–33 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
66. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 871 (S.D. Ohio 2016); 
Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222; G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 729 (4th 
Cir. 2016); Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 661; Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of 
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017). 
70. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (holding that discrimination against 
transgender students likely constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Whitaker, 858 F.3d 
at 1049, 1054 (holding that discrimination against transgender students constitutes sex discrimina-
tion under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution). 
71. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221–22 (holding that discrimination against transgender workers 
may sometimes constitute sex discrimination under Title VII but that such discrimination was not 
covered in all cases); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (holding 
that Title IX does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or transgender status); John-
ston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 657, 676 (holding that Title IX does not prohibit discrimination based on 
gender identity or transgender status). 
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in the coming year, the Supreme Court may decide whether Title VII protects 
transgender individuals in EEOC.72  Its ruling will be instrumental as prece-
dent for lower courts in deciding Title IX cases. 
1. Upcoming Case Law Interpreting Title VII with Regard to 
Discrimination Against Transgender People 
As mentioned in the introduction of this Note, EEOC is currently under 
review by the Supreme Court and has the potential to settle the question of 
whether transgender individuals are protected under Title IX.  In EEOC, 
Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris in Mich-
igan.73  For most of the time Stephens worked at R.G. & G.R. Harris, she 
presented as a male.74  The funeral home fired her shortly after she informed 
the owner that she intended to transition from male to female and would pre-
sent as a woman at work.75  After the owner fired Stephens, she filed a com-
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleg-
ing that she had been terminated as a result of unlawful sex discrimination.76  
After its investigation, the EEOC brought suit against the Funeral Home, 
alleging that it violated Title VII by “terminating Stephens’s employment on 
the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform 
to sex-based stereotypes.”77  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., but the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit reversed.78  The Sixth Circuit held that the termination 
of Stephens based on her status as transgender constituted sex discrimination 
in violation of Title VII.79  It held that the owner’s decision to fire Stephens 
because she was “‘no longer going to represent himself [sic] as a man’ and 
 
72. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 
(Apr. 22, 2019). 
73. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2018). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 566–67. 
78. Id. at 567. 
79. Id. at 600. 
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‘wanted to dress as a woman’” falls within the realm of sex-based discrimi-
nation forbidden under Price Waterhouse and Smith v. City of Salem 
(“Smith”).80 
In Price Waterhouse, a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that 
the Title VII prohibition on employment discrimination based on “sex” en-
compasses sex stereotypes.81  Ann Hopkins was employed by Price Water-
house, an accounting firm, and was denied partnership after waiting two 
years because she had been acting too masculine.82  The Justices reasoned 
that “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”83  The plurality, along 
with two concurring Justices, concluded that a female employee who was 
subject to an adverse employment decision for failing to “walk . . . femi-
ninely, talk . . . femininely, dress . . . femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, [or] wear jewelry,” could claim a violation of Title VII based on 
sex discrimination when the employment decision relied on gender-based 
stereotypes.84  Using the holding in Price Waterhouse, the Sixth Circuit de-
termined in Smith that “discrimination based on a failure to conform to ste-
reotypical gender norms” is encompassed within the word “sex” in Title 
VII.85 
The Supreme Court will hear EEOC to determine “whether Title VII 
prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their status 
as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse.”86  The Court 
will look to past cases on the topic, and its ruling will have a lasting impact 
on how Title IX is interpreted and applied to transgender athletes.  If it de-
termines that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against transgender 
people, it is likely that a student athlete who brings a Title IX claim against 
 
80. Id. at 572 (citation omitted). 
81. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
82. Id. at 231–32, 234–35. 
83. Id. at 251 (citation omitted). 
84. Id. at 235 (citation omitted). 
85. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on Price Water-
house, 490 U.S. at 251). 
86. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 
(Apr. 22, 2019). 
GRUBMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/20  1:14 PM 
176 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
their educational institution for refusing to allow them to participate on the 
sports team that corresponds with their gender identity will fail.  In consid-
ering this issue, the Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning in the follow-
ing cases that support protecting transgender individuals. 
2. Case Law Interpreting Title VII to Protect Transgender 
Individuals 
Lower courts have struggled to determine whether transgender employ-
ees have legitimate sex discrimination claims under Title VII.  Some courts 
have held that these claims are actionable as a form of gender stereotyping 
and sex discrimination.87 
The following cases illustrate the views of the courts that have held that 
discrimination against transgender individuals in the workplace is sex dis-
crimination.  The cases all began with lawsuits filed by individuals who 
claimed they suffered discrimination based on their transgender status in 
their workplace.  The courts reasoned that not only are transgender individ-
uals protected by their status as members of a protected class, these persons 
are also protected by the statutes themselves because, according to two 
highly cited Supreme Court cases, a broad interpretation allows for their pro-
tection against sex discrimination based on their gender identity.88  Based on 
these rulings, if presented with a transgender student athlete’s claim of dis-
crimination based on their status as transgender, these courts89 would also 
likely protect the transgender student athlete under Title IX.  They would 
most likely hold that refusing a transgender athlete’s request to participate 
on the team that corresponds with their gender identity is sex discrimination. 
In Smith, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title VII prohib-
its sex discrimination against transsexual individuals—specifically when 
 
87. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
termination of employee based on her gender transition constitutes sex-based discrimination under 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Smith, 378 F.3d at 571–73 (holding that termination of 
employee based on her gender transition constitutes sex-based discrimination under Title VII). 
88. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); see also 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
89. See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737 (holding that termination of employee based on her 
gender transition constitutes sex-based discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); 
Smith, 378 F.3d at 571–73 (holding that termination of employee based on her gender transition 
constitutes sex-based discrimination under Title VII). 
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such discrimination falls under the category of “sex stereotyping.”90  Jimmie 
L. Smith alleged that Salem discriminated against him on the basis of sex in 
violation of Title VII.91  He was a transsexual firefighter who began express-
ing himself in a more feminine manner at work.92  Smith was subsequently 
suspended and brought suit.93  The court held that “[s]ex stereotyping based 
on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimina-
tion, irrespective of the cause of that behavior.”94  The court relied on the 
precedent set in Price Waterhouse, in which the Supreme Court concluded 
that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination includes a prohibition on 
sex stereotyping: “[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis 
of gender.”95  The Smith court noted that in Price Waterhouse, “the Supreme 
Court established that Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ encompasses both the 
biological differences between men and women, and gender discrimination, 
that is, discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender 
norms.”96 
In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that Phillip Barnes, a police officer, was a member of a protected class by 
virtue of his gender non-conformity and had been discriminated against by 
the city in violation of Title VII.97  Barnes sued the City of Cincinnati for 
illegal sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.98  He alleged that the city 
demoted him because of his failure to conform to sex stereotypes due to the 
fact that he, as a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual, lived as a male 
 
90. Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. 
91. Id. at 567–68. 
92. Id. at 568. 
93. Id. at 569. 
94. Id. at 575. 
95. Id. at 572 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989)). 
96. Id. at 573. 
97. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736–39 (6th Cir. 2005). 
98. Id. at 735. 
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while on duty, but as a female when off duty.99  The court held that he was 
discriminated against because he was a member of a protected class as a 
transsexual under Title VII and was denied a promotion that went to some-
one with similar qualifications who was not a member of the protected 
class.100  In labeling Barnes a member of a protected class, the court relied 
on the ruling in Smith, which determined that transgender individuals are 
members of a protected class.101  The court found that the burden did not 
shift back to the City of Cincinnati to show that they had a non-discrimina-
tory justification for demoting Barnes because Barnes only needed to “pre-
sent sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice,’” and he did that.102 
In Lusardi v. McHugh, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) found that the Army discriminated against Tamara Lusardi in 
violation of Title VII.103  Lusardi filed a complaint with the Army’s office of 
Equal Employment Opportunity alleging that the Army had discriminated 
against her on the basis of sex and gender identity in violation of Title VII.104  
She alleged that after her transition from male to female, she was required to 
use the separate single-user restroom instead of the women’s restroom until 
she had completely medically transitioned, and she was repeatedly referred 
to with male pronouns and by her previous name.105  The Army concluded 
that she failed to prove that she suffered discrimination.106  Lusardi appealed 
to the EEOC, which found that the Army violated Title VII.107  The EEOC 
noted that “[n]othing in Title VII makes any medical procedure a prerequisite 
 
99. Id. at 733. 
100. Id. at 736–37. 
101. Id. at 737 (relying on Smith, 378 F.3d at 575). 
102. Id. at 739–40 (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003)). 
103. Lusardi v. McHugh, 2015 EEOPUB LEXIS 896, at *29 (Apr. 1, 2015). 
104. Id. at *1. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at *10–11. 
107. Id. at *29. 
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for equal opportunity (for transgender individuals, or anyone else)[,]”108 
meaning that this treatment would have been unlawful even if Lusardi was 
born a woman and was not transgender.   
3. Case Law Interpreting Title IX to Protect Transgender 
Individuals 
Two of the most frequently cited cases interpreting Title IX with re-
spect to transgender individuals hold that because the term “sex” in Title IX 
encompasses gender identity, discrimination against a transgender individual 
is sex discrimination.109  Both cases cited Price Waterhouse, reasoning that 
the statute sought to protect men and women by being applicable to the full 
range of disparate treatment resulting from sex stereotypes.110 
Beginning with G. G. v. Gloucester County (“G.G.”), the Fourth Circuit 
found that the local school board violated Title IX when it denied Gavin 
Grimm the right to use the boys bathroom in his high school.111  Grimm, a 
transgender boy, sought to use the boys restrooms at his high school.112  In 
response, the school board passed a policy that banned him from the boys 
restroom.113  The policy stated: “It shall be the practice of the [Gloucester 
County Public Schools] to provide male and female restroom and locker 
room facilities in its schools, and the use of said facilities shall be limited to 
the corresponding biological genders, and students with gender identity is-
sues shall be provided an alternative appropriate private facility.”114  Grimm 
claimed that the school board discriminated against him in violation of Title 
IX.115  In delivering its holding, the court explained that because the prohi-
bition against sex discrimination in Title IX encompasses discrimination 
 
108. Id. at *20. 
109. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016); 
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017). 
110. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 727; Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047. 
111. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 729. 
112. Id. at 714. 
113. Id. at 714–15. 
114. Id. at 716. 
115. Id. at 715. 
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based on gender identity, transgender students must be able to access facili-
ties consistent with their gender identity.116  The court cited to the Depart-
ment of Education’s Office for Civil Rights regulations implementing Title 
IX to determine that “sex” includes gender identity, and therefore protects 
transgender individuals.117  The regulations permit the provision of “separate 
toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facili-
ties provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities 
provided for students of the other sex.”118  The court emphasized that “[t]he 
Department recently delineated how this regulation should be applied to 
transgender individuals,” which the Department explained that “‘[w]hen a 
school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis of sex . . .[,] 
a school generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gen-
der identity.’”119 
Similarly, in Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 
Ashton Whitaker, a transgender boy, sought to use the boys restroom at his 
high school.120  The school district denied his request because it believed 
allowing Whitaker to do so would invade the privacy of his classmates.121  
Whitaker brought suit alleging that the district’s policy violated Title IX.122  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit looked to case law interpreting 
Title VII to construe Title IX.123  It held that the school district violated Title 
 
116. Id. at 718, 721. 
117. Id. at 718. 
118. Id. at 715 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2019)). 
119. Id. at 718 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
120. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1047–48 (“See e.g., Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1023 
(7th Cir. 1997) (noting that ‘it is helpful to look to Title VII to determine whether the alleged sexual 
harassment is severe and pervasive enough to constitute illegal discrimination on the basis of sex 
for purposes of Title IX.’)”; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (holding that 
the plaintiff had been discriminated against by her employer for being too masculine in violation 
of Title VII); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and 
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IX because “a policy that requires an individual to use a bathroom that does 
not conform with his or her gender identity punishes that individual for his 
or her gender non-conformance.”124  The court held that it is unlawful to 
punish someone for their gender non-conformance under Title IX because 
they will then be subject to “different rules, sanctions, and treatment than 
non-transgender students.”125  In interpreting Title IX this way, the court re-
lied on the reasoning in Price Waterhouse and Oncale that both called for a 
broad interpretation of Title VII.126  In those cases, the Supreme Court held 
that in drafting Title IX, “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum 
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes,”127 
and that, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are gov-
erned.”128 
In Dodds v. U.S. Dept. of Education (“Dodds”), the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit held that discrimination against transgender students 
likely constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX.129  It came to this judg-
ment because the anonymous defendant, Jane Doe, showed that she was ex-
cluded from using the bathroom of her choice because of her sex, and that 
this discrimination harmed her.130  The court determined that because the 
definition of “on the basis of sex” in Title IX is ambiguous, by looking at 
how other courts have interpreted it to protect transgender individuals, they 
would apply that reasoning here to protect this student.131  This court cited 
 
it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 
which we are governed.”). 
124. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 1047–48. 
127. Id. at 1048. 
128. Id. at 1048 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). 
129. See Dodds v. U.S. Dept. Of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221–22 (6th Cir. 2016); Bd. of Educ. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 871 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
130. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 870–71. 
131. Id. at 865–70. 
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to the same language in Oncale regarding statutory prohibitions, as quoted 
above, to conclude that protecting transgender individuals is a “reasonably 
comparable evil” to those evils envisioned in the drafting of Title IX.132 
In Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist. (“Doe”), the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit rejected the claim that a school policy that protected 
transgender students violated other students’ rights.133  The court relied on 
the holding in Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ. 
(“Whitaker”), “that a school district’s policy of prohibiting transgender stu-
dents from using bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with their gender 
identity violated Title IX because it discriminated against transgender stu-
dents by subjecting them to ‘different rules, sanctions, and treatment than 
non-transgender students.’”134  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress’s 
intent in passing Title IX could grow to encompass protecting transgender 
individuals.135  The court in Doe held that a sex-neutral policy could not vi-
olate Title IX.136 
If the decisions of these courts and their interpretations of the protec-
tions afforded by Title IX to transgender individuals are adopted by other 
courts, then transgender student athletes would be protected when choosing 
to participate on the sports team that corresponds with their gender identity 
as opposed to their biological sex at birth.  If they were not protected, they 
could be seen as being “punishe[d]”137 for their gender nonconformity, 
which, because of how these cases have read and expanded their interpreta-
tion of Title IX under Oncale and the sex stereotyping theory under Price 
Waterhouse, violates Title IX.138 
 
132. Id. at 867. 
133. Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 536 (3d Cir. 
2018). 
134. Id. (citing Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 
1049 (7th Cir. 2017). 
135. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049. 
136. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d at 534–35. 
137. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049. 
138. Doe by & through Doe, 897 F.3d at 536 (citing Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049); Whitaker, 
858 F.3d at 1047–48; Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 867 (S.D. Ohio 
2016). 
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4. Case Law Interpreting Title VII and Title IX to Exclude 
Protection for Transgender Individuals 
There are a few courts that have held that transgender discrimination 
does not necessarily violate Title VII, and by extension, Title IX.139  These 
courts have construed the word “sex” in Title VII, and by extension Title IX, 
strictly to mean biological sex.140  Sexual orientation and gender identity 
would not be included in the interpretation.141  The courts have read Title IX 
and Title VII strictly—because the statute does not expressly mention gender 
identity or gender expression—they have refused to extend Title IX in those 
cases.142  These courts would hold that not allowing a transgender student to 
participate on the sports team that corresponds with his or her gender identity 
is not discrimination, barring any Title IX lawsuit. 
This view was expressed by the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania in Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh (“Johnston”), a 
case brought under Title IX.143  Seamus Johnston alleged that “[d]efendants 
discriminated against him [in violation of Title IX] based on his sex and his 
transgender status [when they prohibited] him from using sex-segregated 
locker rooms and restrooms that were designated for men.”144  The court held 
that a university that received federal funds is not in violation of Title IX 
when it prohibits a transgender male from using the locker room designated 
 
139. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that discrimination against transgender workers may sometimes constitute sex discrimination under 
Title VII but that such discrimination was not covered in all cases); see, e.g., Johnston v. Univ. of 
Pitt., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 676 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that Title IX does not prohibit discrimina-
tion based on gender identity or transgender status); see, e.g., Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 
3d 810, 832–33 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (holding that Title IX does not prohibit discrimination based on 
gender identity or transgender status). 
140. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676; Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 
832–33. 
141. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676; Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 
832–33. 
142. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221–22; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676; Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d 
at 832–33. 
143. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 657. 
144. Id. at 661. 
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for males.145  The court reasoned that because Title IX does not mention 
“gender identity, gender expression, or gender transition,”146 Johnston failed 
to state a cognizable claim for discrimination on the basis of sex.147 
The Tenth Circuit held the same in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority 
(“Etsitty”).148  Krystal Etsitty alleged she was fired from her job with the 
Utah Transit Authority (UTA) because she disclosed being a transsexual to 
her boss and failed to conform to the stereotypical masculine behavior that 
was expected.149  Etsitty brought suit alleging that her termination violated 
Title VII.150  The district court ruled against her, holding that transsexuals 
are not a protected class under Title VII and that “the prohibition against sex 
stereotyping recognized by some courts should not be applied to transsexu-
als.”151  It further concluded that even if Title VII did apply, there was no 
evidence that UTA terminated Etsitty for failing to conform to gender stere-
otypes.152  She appealed, arguing that she should have been protected under 
Title VII based on her status as a transsexual since “a person’s identity as a 
transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs she possesses, [and] dis-
crimination on this basis must constitute discrimination because of sex.”153  
However, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that 
“it is the plain language of the statute and not the primary intent of Congress 
that guides our interpretation of Title VII . . . [and] there is nothing in the 
record to support the conclusion that the plain meaning of ‘sex’ encompasses 
anything more than male and female.”154  The court held that because the 
text of Title VII only refers to male and female, “discrimination against a 
 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 672. 
147. Id. 
148. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). 
149. Id. at 1218. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 1221. 
154. Id. at 1221–22. 
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transsexual because she is a transsexual is ‘not discrimination because of 
sex,’”155 and “[t]herefore, transsexuals are not a protected class under Title 
VII.”156  However, Title VII does not actually refer to “male” or “female” in 
its text.157 
Another case, Texas v. United States, involved a discrimination claim 
based on transgender status under both Title VII and Title IX.158  In that case, 
thirteen states and agencies sued the U.S. Departments of Education, Justice, 
Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and various other 
agency officials challenging the Dear Colleague Letter published under the 
Obama administration on May 13, 2016, directing schools to respect a 
transgender student’s choice of bathroom, locker room, and shower.159  The 
states challenged the agencies’ assertion that respecting a transgender stu-
dent’s choice of bathroom, locker room, and shower was required under Title 
VII and Title IX.160  The court ruled in favor of the states, issuing an injunc-
tion against the agencies that “enjoined [them] from enforcing the [g]uide-
lines against Plaintiffs and their respective schools, school boards, and other 
public, educationally based institutions.”161  The court held that Title IX does 
not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or transgender status 
because “the plain meaning of the term sex . . . following passage of Title IX 
meant the biological and anatomical differences between male and female 
students as determined at their birth.”162 
These cases argue that the text of Title IX does not refer to transgender 
people, and therefore, they are not protected.  This argument is flawed be-
cause the statute does not specifically refer to “males” or “females” in its 
 
155. Id. at 1222 (citation omitted). 
156. Id. 
157. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2019). 
158. Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815–17 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
159. Id. at 815–16. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 836. 
162. Id. at 832–33. 
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text.163  It only discusses discrimination on the basis of sex.164  Additionally, 
lower court rulings demonstrate this flawed reasoning by applying the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, where the Court confirmed that 
gender discrimination is a type of sex stereotyping,165 which courts have al-
ways held as unlawful.  They also apply the Court’s holding in Oncale, that 
statutes such as Title VII, which extends to Title IX, should be interpreted to 
prohibit similar harms.166  Discrimination against a transgender individual 
because he or she is transgender is a “similar harm”167 to sex discrimination 
against women, which Title IX was specifically enacted to prevent.168  It is 
necessary to look beyond the plain language of the statute to the objectives 
of the congressmembers when they were drafting and passing Title IX to see 
that it would be in line with their original objectives to now protect 
transgender individuals. 
B. The Text of Title IX Requires the Interpretation That “Sex” 
Includes Gender Identity 
Even though Congress likely did not specifically foresee the additional 
categories of “sex,” other than male and female, when it drafted Title IX, the 
language in the statute was clearly intended to protect a holistic society.  If 
Congress’s intent was not to protect a holistic society, and instead to only 
protect cisgender males and cisgender females, it would have tailored the 
langue of Title IX even further.  However, the language of the statute is nev-
ertheless ambiguous, as a new Congressional bill proposed by the Trump 
administration demonstrates.  As scholar Adele Kimmel noted, “Title IX’s 
effectiveness” in addressing transgender athletic participation “is limited by 
 
163. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2019). 
164. Id. 
165. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–40 (1989). 
166. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998). 
167. Id. 
168. 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh on the day Title 
IX was enacted, stating that “the field of education is just one of many areas where differential 
treatment [between men and women] has been documented; but because education provides access 
to jobs and financial security, discrimination here is doubly destructive for women. Therefore, a 
strong and comprehensive measure is needed to provide women with solid legal protection from 
the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to perpetuate second-class citizenship for 
American women.”). 
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two key deficiencies: (1) courts [and the Department of Education’s Office 
for Civil Rights] are interpreting Title IX’s prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation too narrowly,” and (2) Title IX “does not expressly prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.”169  A close read-
ing of the text of Title IX, however, reveals that transgender people should 
be protected because gender identity is an integral part of sex. 
Although modeled after Title VII, Title IX was enacted to accomplish 
two related but divergent objectives.170  First, Congress wanted to ensure its 
funds were not used “to support discriminatory practices.”171  Second, Con-
gress wanted to provide citizens protection against discriminatory prac-
tices.172  As floor debates proceeded on the day Title IX was enacted, Senator 
Birch Bayh advocated that Congress’s broad objective was “to root out, as 
thoroughly as possible at the present time, the social evil of sex discrimina-
tion in education.”173  However, because of the era in which Title IX was 
enacted, it can be argued that it is doubtful that Congress specifically envi-
sioned the term “sex” to include gender identity.174  Congressmembers likely 
envisioned only cisgender males and cisgender females.175 
Soon after entering office, the Trump administration proposed a bill 
that states: 
This bill prohibits the word “sex” or “gender” from being 
interpreted to mean “gender identity,” and requires “man” or 
“woman” to be interpreted to refer exclusively to a person’s 
genetic sex, for purposes determining the meaning of federal civil 
 
169. Adele P. Kimmel, Title IX: An Imperfect But Vital Tool To Stop Bullying of LGBT 
Students, 125 YALE L.J. 2006, 2012–13 (2016). 
170. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). 
174.  See GENNY BEEMYN, TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE 
TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 515–18 (2014) (noting that the Stonewall Riots in NYC in 1969 was 
the turning point for the LGBT movement to gain momentum in the United States. Since this was 
only three years before the enactment of Title IX, it is unlikely that congress members were thinking 
about the LGBT community when drafting). 
175. See id. 
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rights laws or related federal administrative agency regulations or 
guidance. No federal civil rights law shall be interpreted to treat 
gender identity or transgender status as a protected class, unless it 
expressly designates “gender identity” or “transgender status” as 
a protected class.176 
Even those who oppose a more inclusive interpretation of the statute 
acknowledge that the current meaning of “sex” is up for debate.  If it were 
clear, there would be no need to pass this statute.  Therefore, interpreting 
“sex” to include gender identity would not disrupt Congress’s original ob-
jectives; it would show how the interpretation has changed over time.  Con-
gress passed Title IX to ensure equal access to educational opportunities, 
including sports, for everyone, regardless of gender.177  If Congress did not 
want everyone to be afforded protection, it would have narrowed the lan-
guage of Title IX to reflect that desire.  Because the text of the statute is 
ambiguous, it allows for the reading of gender identity into “sex.”  Therefore, 
courts should conclusively hold that discrimination against transgender stu-
dent-athletes violates Title IX, as the courts did in the cases discussed earlier 
in this section.178 
Regardless, because congressional intent is unclear, members of Con-
gress should address the lack of clarity in interpreting “sex” in Title IX and 
by that, Title VII.  Even though reading gender identity into the statute may 
not have been what Congress envisioned at the time the statute was drafted, 
until it clarifies, upon a close reading of the text, it is appropriate for current 
courts and government agencies to read “sex” as including gender identity.  
This is because “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils,”179 and today, discrimination against 
transgender individuals is a comparable evil to the discrimination that Con-
gress was trying to eliminate when it drafted and passed Title IX. 
Opponents of the Trump administration’s view towards the classifica-
tion of individuals protected by Title IX argue that classifying transgender 
 
176. H.R. 2796, 115th Cong. (2017). 
177. Katelyn Burns, The Challenges Ahead for Transgender Athletes and Title IX Under 
Trump, VICE (July 28, 2017, 10:50 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_ca/article/59px8b/the-chal-
lenges-ahead-for-transgender-athletes-and-title-ix-under-trump [https://perma.cc/65T5-7TTD]. 
178. See supra Section III. A. 3. 
179. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
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students according to the sex recorded on their birth certificates would con-
tradict the original intent of Title IX, which sought to guarantee equal access 
to educational opportunities, such as sports, across all genders.180  They ar-
gue that “[t]he very definition of being transgender relates to a person’s sex 
either because it turns on a person’s assigned sex, lived sex, or gender tran-
sition.”181  Because you need some concept of a transgender person’s sex, 
sexual identity, or gender identity to understand that they are transgender, 
discrimination against a transgender person because they are transgender is 
sex discrimination.182  Therefore, refusing to allow a transgender athlete to 
compete on the sports team that corresponds with his or her gender identity 
is discrimination in violation of Title IX. 
IV. WHY ALLOWING TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS TO PARTICIPATE 
ON THE SPORTS TEAM THAT CORRESPONDS WITH THEIR GENDER 
IDENTITY IS GOOD FOR THE U.S. 
The most frequent policy argument that academics and op-ed writers 
have put forward for opposing the inclusion of transgender athletes—and 
specifically transgender female athletes—from the teams that correspond to 
their gender identity is that including them will ruin sports by giving 
transgender students an unfair advantage.183  This belief is unfounded.184  In 
fact, there is more benefit to inclusivity than there is to selectivity.185  This 
Section will first examine how transitions actually affect the performance of 
athletes and will show that medically transitioning takes away a transgender 
female athlete’s competitive advantage.186  Next, this Section will discuss 
 
180. E.g., Burns, supra note 177. 
181. Id. 
182. Macy v. Holder, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, at *34–35 (Apr. 20, 2012). 
183. Bethany Alice Jones et al., Sport and Transgender People: A Systematic Review of the 
Literature Relating to Sport Participation and Competitive Sport Policies, 47 SPORTS MED 701 
(2016). 
184. Id. 
185. Ray Yasser & Matthew Block, Upon Further Review: Recognizing Procedural Due 
Process Rights for Suspended High School Athletes, 26 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 29 (2008). 
186. Joanna Harper, Race Times for Transgender Athletes, J. OF SPORTING CULTURES AND 
IDENTITIES, 2015, at 1, 6. 
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why allowing transgender student athlete participation on teams that corre-
sponds with their gender identity is beneficial, regardless of whether 
transgender individuals have medically transitioned. 
A. How Transitions Affect Performance in Sports 
At a bare minimum, most studies and policy papers discussing 
transgender athletics consider whether an athlete was born male or female to 
be irrelevant to athletic ability.187  The rationale is that transgender persons 
do not have a de facto competitive advantage over their cisgender counter-
parts.188  Those who argue that transgender female athletes—that is, male-
to-female athletes—have an unfair advantage primarily argue that this ad-
vantage stems from transgender individuals having higher testosterone lev-
els.189  However, there are at least two reasons to conclude that testosterone 
levels do not matter.  First, the so-called “GH-2000” study, a study which 
measured testosterone levels in elite athletes, concluded that testosterone 
levels are irrelevant because the natural range of testosterone in all individ-
uals is so wide.190  Second, noted medical physicist Joanna Harper, the 
NCAA, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have all furnished 
data showing that the testosterone and muscle mass levels for individuals 
who have undergone testosterone suppression therapy, a medical treatment 
to bring a transgender woman’s originally male testosterone levels down to 
that of a cisgender female’s levels,191 are comparable to those levels in cis-
gender women.192 
 
187. See e.g., id.; NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 
16, at 7–8. 
188. See Harper, supra note 186, at 6; NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-
ATHLETES, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
189. Jones et al., supra note 183, at 702. 
190. M.L. Healy et al., Endocrine Profiles in 693 Elite Athletes in the Postcompetition Set-
ting, 81 CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 294, 298, 302 (2014). 
191. Harper, supra note 186, at 6. 
192. See id; NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 16, at 
7–8; IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and Hyperandrogenism, INT’L OLYMPIC 
COMM. (Nov. 2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical
_commission/2015-11_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_sex_reassignment_and_hyperandrogenism-
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5BR-GFH4]. 
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Nonetheless, it is still commonly believed by athletics organizations 
and the general public that higher levels of androgenic hormones, especially 
testosterone, give an athlete a competitive advantage.193  This belief is es-
poused by organizations such as the International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF), a worldwide governing body for professional athletics 
that creates and regulates professional meets.194  Due to that belief, 
transgender females are perceived as possessing an unfair advantage, espe-
cially when medication has not been taken to lower testosterone levels and 
bring them down to an average cisgender female level.195  Those who are 
opposed to allowing transgender women to play on the team that matches 
their gender identity do not seem to believe that transgender men, namely 
female-to-male athletes, have a competitive advantage over cisgender men 
even though they are injected with testosterone when they medically transi-
tion—a patently hypocritical view.196  The IOC’s rules allow transgender 
male athletes to enter competitions without restrictions, whereas transgender 
female athletes must demonstrate that their testosterone levels were below a 
certain threshold for at least a year before a competition.197  However, if 
transgender female athletes were allowed to participate on teams that corre-
spond to their gender identity on the condition that they undergo testosterone 
suppression therapy to balance their hormones with cisgender female ath-
letes, while cisgender female athletes do not need to undergo any type of 
medical treatment concerning their hormones, it would likely violate Title 
IX.198  Currently, there is no definitive or consistent research suggesting that 
 
193. Jones et al., supra note 183, at 702. 
194. About the IAAF, IAAF, https://www.iaaf.org/about-iaaf [https://perma.cc/8RRC-
UFYF]. 
195. Jones et al., supra note 183, at 702. 
196. Id. 
197. IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and Hyperandrogenism, supra note 
192. 
198. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (holding that it is unlawful to punish someone for their gender non-conformance under 
Title IX because they will then be subject to “different rules, sanctions, and treatment than non-
transgender students.” Forcing a medical transition to participate would subject transgender indi-
viduals to “different rules, sanctions and treatment”). 
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transgender females have a competitive advantage over cisgender females at 
any stage of their transition because of their higher testosterone levels.199 
In the GH-2000 study, researchers measured hormone levels, including 
testosterone levels, in elite athletes.200  Results showed that the most distinc-
tive criterion in differentiating between male and female athletes is lean body 
mass, not testosterone.201  The researchers believed that these findings were 
sufficient to account for the differences in strength and aerobic performance 
between the sexes.202  They suggested that the hypothesis that testosterone 
levels are the primary determinant of sex differences in athletic performances 
is untenable.203  Based on these findings, policies in place that restrict partic-
ipation by transgender individuals should be reconsidered and revised.204 
Just as there is a great deal of physical variation among cisgender 
women and cisgender men, there is a great deal of physical variation among 
transgender women.205  Nevertheless, the general population often uncon-
sciously or consciously generalizes that all transgender women are unusually 
tall and strong compared to cisgender women.206  This is not necessarily 
true.207  For example, a transgender woman could be small and slender even 
 
199. Jones et al., supra note 183, at 701. 
200. See generally Healy et al., supra note 190, at 294 (Stating that the objective of the 
study was “to measure a profile of hormones in a group of elite athletes.” “Blood samples were 
obtained from 813 volunteer elite athletes from a cross-section of 15 sporting categories. An endo-
crine profile was measured on a subset of 693.”). 
201. Id. at 298 (“On average, a women’s lean body mass [LBM] is both proportionally and 
absolutely much lower than that of men . . . . When the difference in LBM between the sexes is 
calculated . . . on average, elite female athlete’s LBM is 85% that of elite men and elite male ath-
letes have 118% the LBM of elite women. The difference in LBM is sufficient to account for the 
observed differences in strength and aerobic performance seen between the sexes without the need 
to hypothesize that performance is in any way determined by the differences in testosterone lev-
els.”). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 298–302. 
204. Jones et al., supra note 183, at 701. 
205. NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 16, at 7. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
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without hormone blockers or estrogen.208  Medical legal consultants who 
worked with the NCAA to draft its transgender policy postulate that the as-
sumption that all male-bodied people, including transgender women, are 
“taller, stronger, and more highly skilled in a sport” than their female-bodied 
counterparts is inaccurate.209  These medical experts challenge the assump-
tion that transgender women have a competitive advantage.210 
In 2015, four years after the NCAA issued its policy, The Journal of 
Sporting Cultures and Identities published the first study ever conducted on 
transgender athletes, led by medical physicist Joanna Harper.211  She studied 
eight male-to-female transgender runners and the effect medical transition-
ing had on them.212  The study showed that hormone therapy used to medi-
cally transition from male-to-female did more than simply lower testosterone 
levels.213  The therapy caused transgender women to experience a decrease 
in muscle mass along with other changes to their physical characteristics as 
their testosterone levels approached female norms.214  As a result, 
transgender women experienced a loss of speed, strength, and endurance, all 
of which are important aspects of athleticism.215 
Harper later revealed her own personal experience as a transgender run-
ner.216  In less than a year from the start of her medical transition, she saw 
the effects in her athletic performance.217  She was 12% slower.218  After 
 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 7–8. 
211. Harper, supra note 186, at 7–8. 
212. Id. at 3. 
213. Id. at 3–6. 
214. See id. at 6–7. 
215. Id. at 6. 
216. Libby Coleman, Meet the Leading Expert on Trans Athletes, OZY (Jan. 16, 2017), 
https://www.ozy.com/rising-stars/meet-the-leading-expert-on-trans-athletes/74134 [https://
perma.cc/64H5-MQZC]. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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documenting this, she initiated her experiment to see if this outcome was the 
same for all male-to-female athletes who medically transitioned.219  Most 
demonstrated the same results she had experienced.220  After one year of tes-
tosterone suppression therapy, Harper found that the eight subjects had tes-
tosterone levels below the levels found in average cisgender women.221  Of 
the eight subjects, seven showed reductions in their running speed post-tran-
sition.222  The runners became comparably competitive in the women’s divi-
sion as their cisgender opponents.223 
The IOC made their own determination in line with these findings re-
garding transgender athletes’ competition in the Olympics.224  After receiv-
ing pressure for the mishandling of South African runner Caster Semenya’s 
case in 2011, the IOC announced that it “would no longer question an ath-
lete’s sex or gender.”225  It decided that it would allow those individuals who 
identified as women to compete in the women’s category as long as their 
testosterone levels were within the female range.226 
In 2018, the IAAF, a worldwide governing body for professional ath-
letics that creates and regulates professional meets,227 announced new rules 
that would require female athletes, whether transgender or cisgender, to take 
medication to lower their testosterone levels to a certain range in order to 
 
219. Id. 
220. Id.; see generally Harper, supra note 186, at 4–7. 
221. See generally Harper, supra note 186, at 6. 
222. Id. at 3. 
223. Id. at 6. 
224. See IOC Rules Transgender Athletes can Take Part in Olympics Without Surgery, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jan/25/ioc-rules-
transgender-athletes-can-take-part-in-olympics-without-surgery [https://perma.cc/DAY7-A3XC]; 
see generally IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and Hyperandrogenism, supra note 
192. 
225. Coleman, supra note 32, at 122. 
226. Id. 
227. About the IAAF, supra note 194. 
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compete.228  Semenya, a female-born runner with above-average testosterone 
levels, challenged this rule and took the case to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, which ruled against her in May 2019.229  The court’s ruling allows the 
IAAF to require transgender female athletes to take medication to lower their 
testosterone levels if they wish to compete internationally.230 
Although it is generally appropriate to separate males and females into 
separate sports teams since, in the aggregate, males are bigger and 
stronger,231 it is unreasonable to attempt to police the boundaries precisely 
because there are individuals of varying abilities within each category.  Some 
men are simply bigger and stronger than other men.  The same is true for 
women.  Whether cisgender or transgender, every athlete has their own ad-
vantages and disadvantages.232  As Washington Post columnist Steven 
Petrow wrote: 
People come in all shapes and sizes. We don’t disqualify Michael 
Phelps for having super-long arms; that’s just a competitive 
advantage he has in his sport. We don’t regulate height in the 
WNBA or NBA; being tall is just an advantage for a center. For 
as long as sports have been around, there have been people who 
have had advantages over others. A universal level playing field 
does not exist.233 
 
228. IAAF Introduces New Eligibility Regulations for Female Classification, IAAF (Apr. 
26, 2018), https://www.iaaf.org/news/press-release/eligibility-regulations-for-female-classifica 
[https://perma.cc/REB7-XFWD]. 
229. Caster Semenya: Olympic 800m Champion Loses Appeal Against IAAF Testosterone 
Rules, BBC (May 1, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/sport/athletics/48102479 [https://perma.cc
/9URR-TQ4P]. 
230. Id. 
231. A. E. J. Miller et al., Gender Differences in Strength and Muscle Fiber Characteris-
tics, 66 EUR. J. APPLIED PHYSIOLOGY 254, 261 (1993). 
232. Steven Petrow, Do Transgender Athletes Have an Unfair Advantage at the Olympics?, 
THE WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/do-transgender-
athletes-have-an-unfair-advantage-at-the-olympics/2016/08/05/08169676-5b50-11e6-9aee-
8075993d73a2_story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/B2BA-SH3L]. 
233. Id. 
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If one considers it unjust for any one female athlete to be better than 
another female athlete, there would be no competition.  Sports authorities 
should not have to do testosterone tests for every athlete in all situations. 
B. Why Allowing Transgender Individuals to Participate on the 
Team That Corresponds with Their Gender Identity Is Beneficial 
Participation in an athletic program creates an “increased likelihood of 
overall academic success, an increased likelihood of completing school, the 
development of positive character traits, and better health and overall well-
being.”234  It can also provide students with life lessons of self-respect, self-
esteem, self-confidence, the importance of teamwork, how to deal with suc-
cess and failure, along with the joy of being a member of a team.235   
Refusing to allow transgender athletes to join the team that corresponds 
with their gender identity is not justifiable differential treatment.  The Trump 
administration’s reasoning is not supported based on the science, as well as 
the fact that the number of transgender students is very small, and fundamen-
tally not all of these individuals will necessarily wish to participate in 
sports.236  Only 0.7%–1.6% of adolescents identify as transgender in the 
United States.237  Even if gender-based classifications are maintained in 
sports, transgender female athletes will not be able to dominate the girls’ 
programs and “deny [cisgender girls] an equal opportunity to compete in in-
terscholastic events.”238 
Athletic participation provides unique benefits for young individuals, 
and transgender student athletes should not be denied those benefits on the 
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basis of their gender identity.239  Young men and women develop their iden-
tity in their teens and twenties, particularly during high school and college,240 
and gender is a core part of one’s identity.241  Forcing transgender students 
to suppress their gender, whether in athletics or otherwise, will negatively 
impact their lives and social abilities.242 
However, some scholars believe allowing transgender individuals’ par-
ticipation in sports is not the right solution.243  One scholar agrees that read-
ing gender identity into the term “sex” could produce important benefits for 
transgender individuals, but argues that despite these benefits, allowing 
transgender individuals to participate on the team that corresponds to his or 
her gender identity will impede the success of competitive sport’s institu-
tional goals.244  The same scholar goes on to state that reading gender identity 
into “sex” “would be a costly exchange[,]” and therefore, “the question is 
ultimately whether, on balance, the case for respecting identity outweighs 
the case for respecting biology.”245 
As the Third Circuit recently proclaimed, there can be “no denying that 
transgender individuals face discrimination, harassment, and violence be-
cause of their gender identity.”246  Transgender individuals have been relent-
lessly marginalized throughout history.247  The transgender community is 
“associated with high levels of stigmatization, discrimination and victimiza-
tion, contributing to negative self-image and increased rates of other mental 
 
239. Yasser & Block, supra note 185, at 28–29. 
240. See Monique Verhoeven et al., The Role of School in Adolescents’ Identity Develop-
ment. A Literature Review, 31 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 35, 35–63 (2018). 
241. NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 16, at 5. 
242. Id. at 7. 
243. Coleman, supra note 32, at 63; Ray D. Hacke, “Girls Will be Boys, and Boys Will be 
Girls”: The Emergence of the Transgender Athlete and a Defensive Game Plan for High Schools 
That Want to Keep Their Playing Fields Level - For Athletes of Both Genders, 18 TEX. REV. ENT. 
& SPORTS L. 131, 152–53 (2018). 
244. Coleman, supra note 32, at 111. 
245. Id. 
246. Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 528 (3d Cir. 
2018). 
247. Coleman, supra note 32, at 102. 
GRUBMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/20  1:14 PM 
198 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
disorders.”248  To alter that trend, a policy that recognizes and accepts 
transgender athletes—from the adolescent stages—as having the same op-
portunities as cisgender athletes, could help deter the stigma associated with 
identifying as transgender.  Transgender individuals must be enabled to grow 
up and express themselves in the way they choose, including in the realm of 
sports.  Given the established benefits of physical activity and sport for 
youths, athletic inclusivity is necessary.249  This is especially important for 
transgender students because of the historical marginalization these individ-
uals have suffered and the high risk that they will continue to be marginal-
ized.   
Sports present a unique challenge to courts and lawmakers.  In deter-
mining how to create or construe the law, they must “balanc[e] the need for 
equal access [to opportunities] with concerns . . . [about] unfair competitive 
advantage.”250  This intention does not in itself require sports to be perfectly 
fair.  A competitive advantage always exists, whether due to an athlete’s 
longer arms for swimming, or a height advantage in basketball.  The door for 
opportunity simply needs to remain open to everyone.  Moreover, concerns 
about safety and fairness in high school and college sports are not enough to 
justify discrimination against transgender student athletes.251  The balancing 
of need for equal access with concerns about fairness clearly tips in favor of 
civil rights protections for transgender students.  The threat these individuals 
present to fairness in sports is, as demonstrated above, substantially over-
blown.  Therefore, transgender athletes should be able to participate on the 
sports team that matches their gender identity. 
V. HOW THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SOLVE THE UNCERTAINTY 
SURROUNDING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT ATHLETES 
Students who have medically transitioned through surgery or hormone 
use should be allowed to participate on the sports team that corresponds with 
their gender identity.  Emerging medical research reveals that post-transition 
transgender women have no competitive advantage over cisgender 
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women.252  However, even without medically transitioning, transgender stu-
dent athletes should be able to participate on the sports team that corresponds 
with their gender identity.  Even if these individuals do have a competitive 
advantage, this is a reasonable price to pay because transgender individuals’ 
interests in equality will not fundamentally alter the sex equality benefits that 
are derived from having sex-segregated teams because there are so few of 
these individuals.  They should have the choice to compete on the team that 
corresponds with their gender identity by qualifying on the basis of ability, 
not genetic assignment at birth.  Often, individuals incorrectly apply a cau-
sation effect to the world of sports.  If you are tall, you must be good at 
basketball.  Likewise, if you are fast, you must run track or cross country.  
However, physical features mean nothing if the athlete does not have the 
skill, knowledge, and training to be competitive.  The winner of two equally 
quick runners, one of whom is cisgender and the other transgender, will turn 
on who has the longer strides, knows how to carry his or her arms with the 
wind, knows when to pace themselves, understands the appropriate breathing 
habits, understands when to accelerate and when to not, pays attention to the 
clock, and more. 
It may seem as though the fairest solution would be to require 
transgender female athletes in high school and college to medically transi-
tion—either surgically or with hormones—to lower their testosterone levels 
before allowing them to participate with other athletes of their gender.  How-
ever, in Lusardi v. McHugh, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ruled that “[a]n agency may not condition access to facilities—or to 
other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment—on the completion of 
certain medical steps that the agency itself has unilaterally determined will 
somehow prove the bona fides of the individual’s gender identity.”253  There-
fore, it may be held unconstitutional for a school to require transgender stu-
dent athletes to medically transition in order to participate on the sports team 
that corresponds with the student’s gender identity.  Thus, forcing students 
to medically transition to participate on sports teams would likely be imper-
missible under Title IX.  Although courts are just beginning to address dis-
crimination claims by transgender students under Title IX, they should allow 
them as per se discrimination claims.254 
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Congress can directly support the civil rights of transgender individuals 
through a number of actions.  First, Congress could amend the language of 
Title IX to specifically include transgender individuals.  For example, the 
amended statute could read: “No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, including biological sex, sexual orientation, gender, and gender 
identity, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.”  It could also pass independent legislation 
that creates the same result.  This could include passing the proposed Student 
Non-Discrimination Act of 2015,255 which was reintroduced in Congress in 
2018.256  This legislation would protect LGBTQ students from discrimina-
tion in their schools.257  Because of the ambiguity of Title IX’s protections 
as written, this Act would function as a clarification of the scope of the stat-
ute, explicitly stating that transgender individuals are protected.  Section 4(a) 
states that: 
No student shall, on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orien-
tation or gender identity of such individual or of a person with 
whom the student associates or has associated, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance.258 
It is modeled on Title IX, but would explicitly protect transgender in-
dividuals who choose to participate in any activities a school offers, includ-
ing using a particular bathroom or choosing to join a specific sports team. 
Regardless of whether Title IX gets clarified or revised, schools should 
also adopt their own policies allowing transgender students to participate on 
sports teams that correspond to their gender identity.  Individual school 
boards should enact policies to protect transgender students even beyond ath-
letic participation, including the choice of which locker room or bathroom to 
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use, by roundly prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity discrimi-
nation in their school facilities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The interpretation of “sex” under Title IX should be readopted as de-
fined by the Obama administration to mean that transgender high school and 
college athletes cannot be prohibited from playing on the sports team that 
corresponds with their gender identity.  This reading is consistent with sev-
eral court rulings on Title VII’s interpretation of “sex,” which courts have 
applied to Title IX causes of action, as well as the few Title IX rulings on the 
subject.  Limiting the definition of ‘sex’ to biological sex abridges 
transgender individuals’ civil rights.  Concerns about safety and fairness do 
not justify this abridgement.259 
Courts should hold that discrimination against transgender student ath-
letes is unlawful under Title IX because sex discrimination is a form of gen-
der discrimination, as courts and scholars have continued to acknowledge.  
Supporting this interpretation and enacting inclusive policies for transgender 
student athletes can help create and foster support for transgender youth, 
working to erase the stigma associated with identifying as transgender.260  
Title IX was designed to protect civil rights in the manner described in this 
Article, and courts across the country are acknowledging this fact.261  Clari-
fying the inclusivity of Title IX, however, must come from the government 
to dispel all doubt that federal law protects transgender rights. 
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